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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
A. FRED FLEMING, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
1
), 
vs. Case 
FLEMING FELT COMPANY, a corpo-
ration, and JOSEPH H. FELT and 
J\.fARIE FELT, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
( No. 8732 
) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
POINT NO. I 
THE COURT HAS PROPERLY GRANTED RESTITU-
TION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BY AWARDING 
FLEMING THE VALUE OF HIS INVENTORY HE PUT 
INTO THE BUSINESS. 
This Court has properly determined that the trial court 
clearly regarded the conduct of the Felts as a substantial breach 
of their contract with Fleming, thus rendering it impossible 
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for Fleming to continue performance and excusing him from 
further performance. 
In view of this material and substantial breach of the 
contract by the Felts, this Court properly awarded restitution 
to Fleming as a remedy, even thought the claim of fraud was 
not sustained. 
The Restatement of Contracts sets forth the well-settled 
rule that restitution may be granted for a material and sub-
stantial breach of contract, as follows: 
" ( 1) For the total breach of a contract, the injured 
party can get judgment for the reasonable value of a 
performance rendered by him, measured as of the time 
it was rendered, less the amount of benefits received 
as part performance of the contract and retained by 
him, ... " Section 347, Restatement of Contracts. 
The comment on sub-section ( 1) also states as follows: 
"b. When the remedy given for breach of a contract 
is money damages, the amount awarded is determined 
with the purpose of putting the injured party in as good 
a position as he would have occupied, had the contract 
been fully performed by the defendant. In granting 
restitution as a remedy for breach, however, the pur-
pose to be attained is the restoration of the injured 
party to as good a position as that occupied by him 
before the contract was made. It is obvious that neither 
remedy may fully attain the purpose for which it exists. 
In some cases the remedy of restitution involves the 
restoration to the plaintiff of a specific thing (see 
§ 354); but in the great majority of cases this remedy 
merely requires a payment in money by the defendant 
of the value of the consideration received by him from 
the plaintiff as a part or full performance of the con-
tract. The consideration so received may be of any 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
kind, commonly cons1stmg of services rendered, for-
bearance given, money or other property transferred, 
or the use of property temporarily enjoyed." 
"e. The remedy in damages for a breach of contract 
by the defendant is available without regard to whether 
the breach is total or partial. The alternative remedy 
of restitution, however, is available to the plaintiff 
only in case the defendant's breach of contract is a 
total breach (defined in § 313) . It must be a breach 
that prevents further performance by the plaintiff, or 
that gives him the privilege of refusing any further 
performance of the contract on his own part." 
"(I) Damages and restitution are alternative reme-
dies, only one of which will be given as a remedy for 
a breach of contract." Section 384, Restatement of Con-
tracts. 
The comments on sub-section (I) also states as follows: 
"a. The remedy of restitution is given only when 
there is a total breach justifying the plaintiff in regard-
ing the primary contractual obligation as at an end and 
acted upon by him as having that effect. The defend-
ant's breach is regarded as final, and thereafter only 
one action for breach of the contract can be maintained. 
If the plaintiff is given judgment for his money back 
or for the restoration of the status quo in another 
form, he will not also be awarded the value of the 
performance that was promised him." 
To the same effect are the following citations: 
"The right to rescind is an extreme one and does not 
arise from every breach, and the general rule is that 
a rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual 
breach of the contract, but only for such breaches as arc 
so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object 
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of the parties in making the agreement." 17 CJS, Con-
tracts, Section 442, page 906. 
"Williston on Contracts, vol. 3 § 1467, p. 2614, says: 
'In truth rescission is imposed in invitum by the law 
at the option of the injured party, and it should be, 
and in general is, allowed not only for repudiation or 
total inability, but also for any breach of contract of 
so material and substantial a nature as could constitute 
a defense to an action brought by the party in default 
for a refusal to proceed with the contract.' See also, 
Black on Rescission of Contracts, §§ 198, 199; Tighe 
v. Empire Bond & Mortgage Corporation, 144 Misc. 
146, 258 N. Y. S. 278." 
"If, however, the vendors terminate the contract 
without right or cause, the vendee could rescind and 
recover the amount paid on the contract." Dastrup, 
et al., vs. Swuin, et al., 179 Fed. Rep. 2d 862. 
Citing Brown vs. Cleverly, 93 Utah 5470 P. 2d, 881 
McBride vs. Setwart, 68 Utah 12, 249, P. 114 
Tremonton Inv. Co. vs. Horne, 59 Utah 156, 202 P. 
547. 
• 
In the case of At1cBride vs. Steu·art. (Utah) 249 P. 114, 
48 A.L.R., 267, the Court held as follows: 
·'The plaintiff in this action accepted the breach of 
the contract upon the part of defendants and brought 
this action to recover what she had paid, less the rea-
sonable rental value of the premises. As was clearly her 
right, she elected to take as damages the amount paid, 
less the benefit she received, and that is what the court 
granted her in the judgment. She did not elect to sue 
for profits or the value of the property if it exceeded 
the value of the contract price, but was content to re-
cover back what she paid." 
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Section 145 5 of Williston on Contracts states as follows: 
"The right of rescission and restitution generally 
exists as an alternative remedy to an action for damages 
where there has been repudiation or a material breach 
of a contract, and is most commonly exercised when 
the aggrieved party has performed fully or in part, 
and wishes to recover what he has given or its value." 
"A material breach warrants rescission. There may be 
a rescission if there is a failure to perform a substantial 
part of the contract or one of its essential terms." 12 
Am. Jur., Sec. 440, P. 1021, citing many cases. 
"Where a party has partially performed a contract 
on his side and a renunciation is made by the other 
party in the course of performance, or where such other 
party prevents or makes further performance impos-
sible, the party injured may treat the contract as re-
scinded and sue at once on a quantum meruit to recover 
for what he has performed or what has been paid by 
him." 12 Am. Jur., Sec. 442, P. 1024. 
As an alternative to damages for breach, respondent 
clearly alleged in his Complaint rescission and restitution for 
breach of contract and also included a count for quantum 
meruit (R. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), and in view of the fact that the 
claim of fraud was not sustained on appeal, this resulted in 
a loss of the interest during the time Fleming was in the busi-
ness; this being the only modification of the Judgment of the 
lower court. The above citations clearly indicate that respondent 
is entitled to the value of his inventory at the time it was placed 
in the business. 
As stated in the Opinion of this Court: 
"Inasmuch as the trial court determined that the 
disruption of the business arrangement resulted from 
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breaches by the Felts, it was proper to justify Fleming's 
withdrawal and to award him the value of the inventory 
he had put into the business, which it found to be 
$13,512.00." 
POINT NO. II 
FLEMING IS REQUIRED TO RETURN THE 13,512 
SHARES OF STOCK OF THE FLEMING-FELT COM-
PANY UNDER THE DECISION OF THE COURT AND 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD, THEREFORE, NOT BE RE-
DUCED BY REASON OF SAID SHARES. 
Fleming would not have purchased the 13,512 shares of 
stock of the Fleming Felt Company if he could not act as general 
manager and purchase the remainder of the outstanding 25,234 
shares of stock owned by the Felts, as provided in the contract. 
These 13,512 shares of stock are of no actual value to 
Fleming in view of the appellants' breach of contract. It is 
only fair and equitable that the stock be returned to the appel-
lants and the respondent receive the value of his merchandise. 
l
jl.. 
Iii: 
Otherwise, the appellants would be rewarded for their breach ~ 
of contract and unjustly enriched. 
Loss of profits to Fleming as a measure of damage could 
not, under the circumstances, be ascertained with any degree 
of reasonable certainty, and the plaintiff elected, therefore, to 1 -
recover the value of his merchandise put into the business and 
tendered the shares of stock to the defendants. 
There was no inventory of the Fleming Felt Company 
taken on June 8, 1955, which could be used as a basis for 
determining the value of its assets at that time.This could only 
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be determined by conjecture. Even the inventory used in Exhibit 
12-P (R. 265) was estimated and was an arbitrary computation, 
incompetent to show a loss, and Mr. Owen Sumsion, a certified 
public accountant, so testified. 
In view of the speculative nature of profits to the respond-
ent, the court properly granted restitution as is indicated in 
25 C.J.S. 577, Sec. 78: 
"Profits may be too remote and speculative to be 
capable of the clear and direct proof required by law, 
and in such case plaintiff is confined to his loss of actual 
outlay and expense. Failure to prove profits, however, 
will not prevent a recovery for outlay and expense." 
U. S. vs. Behan, 110 US 338, 28 L. Ed. 168. 
The claim of the appellants that the business was losing 
money is strictly supposition, unsupported by the evidence 
in view of Owen Sumsion's testimony concerning Exhibit 12-P 
(R. 131, 191), and the finding of the lower court that "Fleming 
kept or offered to keep and to perform all of the provisions of 
said agreement." Even if the company had lost money, it would 
have been due to the Felts' actions in preventing Fleming from 
carrying out his duties, since a further finding by the court 
was that defendants "refused to permit plaintiff to carry out 
his duties as general manager." 
The Stitzinger case, cited by the appellants, is not in point 
and can be distinguished since in that case Stitzinger sought 
anticipated profits and, in addition, the amount paid for the 
stock. The cases cited above make it clear that both the value 
of the performance, and the outlay, plus expenses, cannot be 
granted. They are alternative remedies, only one of which 
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may be awarded. In the case at bar the respondent was only 
granted one of the two alternative remedies. 
Under the Judgment of the lower court (R. 275), as 
modified, it is clear that Fleming must return the 13,512 shares 
of stock upon payment of the Judgment. The stock must be 
returned in restoring the status quo in granting restitution, 
and there is, therefore, no need to determine what, if any, 
doubtful value these minority shares in a closed corporation 
would have to Fleming. 
Petition for Rehearing should be denied and the Decree 
of this Court sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH Y. LARSEN, JR. 
15 East Fourth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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